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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
WAYNE B. BAKER, ) 
) 
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Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
CHARLES W. TAGGART, a single ) 
man; H. B. WADE and EDNA ) 
WADE, his wife; VALLEY BANK ) 
& TRUST COMPANY; and ) 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, ) 
) 
Defendants and ) 
Respondents. ) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
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Plaintiff asserted in his Complaint in this action, that 
the real property which had been previously owned by 
Taggart was conveyed to Defendant, H. B. WADE (hereinafter 
"Wade") as security for a loan made by Wade to Taggart. 
Plaintiff also asserted that the transfer occurred at a 
time when Taggart was insolvent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon Motion for Summary Judgment or by Default, the 
claims of all Defendants to the property other than the 
claims of Defendants H. B. Wade and Edna Wade were found 
to be inferior to the claims of the Plaintiff. At 
trial, the assertion of Defendants Wade that a sale of 
the subject property had occurred, was upheld. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a reversal of the District 
Court's Judgment in favor of the Defendants Wade. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The evidence at trial established that Plaintiff 
Wayne B. Baker obtained a judgment in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
Civil No. 222226, against Defendant Taggart for approximately 
$45,800.00 (Exhibit P-1) and that at the date of trial 
of this action, Defendant Taggart was indebted to Plaintiff 
Baker for approximately $60,000.00. 
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It was further established that Taggart executed and 
delivered a Quit-Claim Deed to Defendant H. B. Wade dated the 
19th day of March, 1975. (Exhibit P-2) At the same time and 
as part of the same transaction, Taggart executed a promissory 
note in the sum of $20,000.00 payable to Wade Finance (H. B. 
Wade's investment company), which promissory note set forth 
that it was "secured by a deed on property located at 234 
Seventh Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah." (Exhibit P-3) Although 
Taggart received only $10,000.00 from Wade at this date, Wade 
executed an "option" permitting Taggart or his assigns for a 
period of 90 days to "repurchase" the property at 234 Seventh 
Avenue for $10,900.00. (Exhibit P-4) Wade testified that he 
was not required to advance any further monies to Taggart until 
such time as the option held by Taggart had expired. Not-
withstanding this "purported sale", Taggart continues to this 
date to occupy the real property making monthly mortgage 
payments of approximately $450.00 as his sole "rent". 
Subsequent to the expiration of the "option", Wade on 
two separate occasions advanced additional monies to 
Taggart totalling $7,000.00. At each time, Taggart 
executed a promissory note made payable to H. B. Wade 
for the amount of the monies advanced. The first such 
-3-
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promissory note dated October 15, 1975 stated it was 
"secured by home at 234 Seventh Ave., S.L.C., Utah", 
with the second promissory note dated November 28, 1975, 
indicating on its reverse side that it was for the 
"Balance in Full for Equity in Home located at 234 
Seventh Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah." 
Additionally, Taggart testified that he had "no 
assets in 1975" and that the value of the real property 
in March, 1975 was between $45,000.00 and $50,000.00. 
It was also established by introduction of a transcript 
of prior testimony that on July 7, 1975, Taggart testified 
while under oath before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft 
that he had given a deed to his home as security for a 
loan. To date, Taggart has deducted upon his individual 
income tax returns interest paid by him with respect to 
the mortgages upon the real property while the Defendant 
Wade, at least for the years 1977 and 1978, did not 
report any rental income from the subject property or 
take any interest deduction with respect thereto. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EXISTENCE OF AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE IS 
ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
It is plaintiff's contention that the purported conveyance 
of real property by Taggart to H. B. Wade on the 19th day of 
-4-
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March, 1975 was in actuality the grant of a security interest 
or an "equitable mortgage". It is conceded by the plaintiff 
that the existence of an equitable mortgage must be established 
by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. Corey v. 
Roberts, 24 P.2d 940, 942 (Utah 1922). The facts and exhibits 
established at trial and set forth herein meet that level of 
proof requiring this Court to reverse the judgment of the 
District Court. 
In determining whether or not a deed, absolute on its 
face, is intended by the parties as a mortgage, the Utah 
Supreme Court in Corey v. Roberts, supra at 942-43, set forth 
some of the essential elements to be considered: 
Whether or not there was a continuing 
obligation on the part of the granter to 
pay the debt or meet the obligation which 
it is claimed the deed was made to secure; 
the question of relative values; the 
contemporaneous and subsequent acts; the 
declarations and admissions of the parties; 
the form of the written evidences of the 
transactions; the nature and character of 
the testimony relied upon; the various 
business, social or other relationship of 
the parties; and the apparent aims and 
purposes to be accomplished. 
An examination of the evidence in light of these elements 
establishes by clear and convincing evidence the existence of 
an equitable mortgage at the date of execution and delivery of 
the Quit-Claim Deed. (Exhibit P-2) 
-5-
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A. Continuing Obligation of Granter to Pay Debt. De-
fendant Taggart executed at the insistence of defendant H. B. 
Wade, not one, but three promissory notes, each by its terms 
providing an obligation on the part of Taggart to pay to Wade 
the amounts set forth therein. 
B. Relative Values. As of the date of the conveyance, 
Taggart testified at trial that the value of the real property 
was "around $45,000 to $50,000" with outstanding encumbrances 
of "approximately $25,000 or $30,000". (Taggart Cross-Examina-
tion, page 41) Thus, at the time Wade advanced the first 
$10,000 and at a time when Wade did not have to advance any 
additional monies in the event Taggart exercised his option to 
repurchase, Taggart had an additional equity interest in the 
real property from $5,000 to $15,000. 
C. Contemporaneous and Subseguent Acts of the Parties. 
The most notable contemporaneous act of the parties was the 
drafting and execution of a promissory note (Exhibit P-3) which 
was used to make "a record of what our transaction was". (Wade 
Direct Examination, pages 60-61) This record unequivocally 
shows upon its face that a deed was given upon the subject 
property as security for the promissory note. Simultaneously 
with the creation of this instrument, the parties drafted and 
Wade executed an option (Exhibit P-4) allowing Taggart to "re-
purchase" the property within 90 days for $10,900. (Incident-
-6-
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ally, interest at the rate of 18% upon $20,000 for 90 days 
equals $900.) Even after the option period set forth in 
Exhibit P-4 had expired, two additional promissory notes were 
executed by Taggart. One note, Exhibit P-7, also sets forth 
that it was secured by the real property. 
Of equal importance to the existence of promissory notes 
establishing secured obligations is evidence that Taggart is 
and has been in constant possession of the real property since 
the purported conveyance. His only "rent" as the defendants 
Taggart and Wade would characterize it, is the payment of the 
first and second mortgage payments (including reserves) secured 
by the real property. Defendant Wade has expended nothing 
further with respect to the real property or any encumbrances 
thereon. (Wade Direct Examination, pages 73-74) 
Finally, the testimony of the parties and exhibits P-12 
through P-15, inclusive, strongly support the existence of an 
equitable mortgage rather than a sale. The individual income 
tax returns of both defendants Taggart and Wade as prepared and 
filed with the Internal Revenue Service are inconsistent with 
the assertions that a sale of real property occurred. Taggart 
claims as an itemized deduction interest paid upon the first 
and second mortgage with American Savings, payments which he 
and Wade claim are rental payments and whch are not deductible 
as such. Wade for the years 1977 and 1978 neither shows any 
-7-
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rental income from Taggart or the real property nor claims any 
interest deduction for the mortgage payments. (Wade Direct 
Examination, pages 77-78) 
D. Declarations and Admissions of the Parties. Taggart 
characterized the transaction on many occasions. On July 7, 
1975, before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Taggart, while 
under oath, conceded that he had borrowed money from Wade and 
had given as security therefor, a quit-claim deed to his home. 
(Taggart Direct Examination, pages 24-25 and Exhibit P-11) When 
presented with testimony from his deposition that the trans-
action was a loan, Taggart tried to explain. 
[Deposition Question] "You felt it was 
basically a loan and he [Wade] was secured 
by the deed. Is that correct? 
A. "No, we treated it as I said in my 
first testimony, as a loan. But he [I] had 
the option and I hoped to be able to pay it 
back. If I couldn't pay it back --" 
Q: "He had the property?" 
A: "He had the property, of course." 
Q: But your testimony there does say it 
was treated as a loan? 
A: Well, I--maybe I said that, but in my 
mind, I may have treated it as that, but 
in actuality, he owned the property. 
When questioned regarding the terms of the option which Wade 
had given, Taggart testified: 
I know at the time this --- at the time 
that I borrowed the money, I had no idea 
what was happening to me. (Taggart Direct 
Examination, page 15, Emphasis added.) 
-8-
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When asked how much he had to pay to obtain the house back upon 
exercise of the option, Taggart stated: "I had to pay Mr. Wade 
the amount lent to me plus the $900.00 option plus the 18% 
interest". (Taggart Direct Examination, page 19) 
Wade's testimony, as elicited by his attorney, also 
suggests the existence of an equitable mortgage rather than a 
sale. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. FERRARI: 
Q: Mr. Wade, I show you the document, 
which has been marked as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 2 in this matter, which is a 
Promissory Note signed on March the 19th, 
1975. You took part in the preparation of 
that document, did you not? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Okay. What did you intend that docu-
ment to reflect? 
A: That reflected the deal that Mr. 
Taggart and I made. 
Q: Okay. What was that deal to your 
understanding? 
A: The deal was that we'd gone through 
this. I was given $20,000 and an option. 
Didn't give it all to him, then. Then--and 
he was to buy back for this amount of 
money. So, he couldn't come back and say, 
well, this should have been twenty-five or 
thirty. It was evidence there of what the 
deal was. 
So, when I advanced him the $10,000 
with option to repurchase it with the 
understanding if he couldn't--if he couldn't 
pay the option, then I would pay him the 
balance of this money. 
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Q: Now, would you tell us why you chose to 
memorialize an arrangement by which you 
would pay him $20,000 for his home, and he 
would receive an option to buy it back in 
the form of a Promissory Note? 
A: Well, I had to have something drawn up 
to know where we were going. And he knew, 
and I knew that if he didn't exercise that 
option, he was to get $20,000. And if 
he paid it back, he was to pay the $20,000 back 
with stipulations on it. 
(Wade Direct Examination, pages 86-87) 
Wade's reference to "paying it back" is language of a loan, not 
language of a sale. 
E. Written Evidence. The promissory note of March 19, 
1975 (Exhibit P-3) leaves no doubt regarding the intentions of 
the parties surrounding the conveyance of the real property. 
Admittedly part of the same transaction, the note provides: 
This note and the interest thereon is 
secured by a deed on property located at 234 
7th Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Wade Testified that he "more or less . • • contributed the 
language of it". (Wade Direct Examination, page 61). Because 
most of the language of the note was preprinted, there was no 
accident in his choice of words regarding the secured status of 
the note. He must now be held to that very language he chose 
and at trial insisted upon ignoring. 
A second promissory note, Exhibit P-7, much like Exhibit 
P-3 also evidences that the transactions were not intended as 
a conveyance but was to be treated as an equitable mortgage. 
-10-
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Finally, the option signed by Wade and given to Taggart 
evidences an understanding among the parties that Taggart, upon 
repayment of $10,000 plus an option fee {interest) could 
obtain or redeem the property. Although the existence of a 
right to redeem is not conclusive that a mortgage was intended, 
the Court held in Gibbons v. Gibbons, 135 P.2d 105 {Utah 1943) 
that without the right there can be no mortgage. Consequently, 
the option further supports the existence of an equitable 
mortgage. 
F. Nature of and Character of Testimony Relied Upon. As 
is most readily apparent to the Court, plaintiff has been 
required to prove his case from the mouths of two biased 
defendants. Although defendants asserted at trial that their 
transaction was a sale rather than a loan, the written docu-
mentation and part of their testimony suggest the contrary. 
The best evidence, the written documentation created at the 
date of the purported conveyance, is the clearest indication of 
the parties' intention at the date of the transaction. Al-
though defendants' oral testimony says that a sale occurred, 
the written documentation is in direct conflict with this 
assertion. Would defendants now have this Court disregard the 
clear language drafted by them contained in the promissory note 
(Exhibit P-3) that the note was secured by a deed. 
-11-
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G. Relationship and Aims. The relationship and aims of 
the defendants Wade and Taggart are best illustrated by their 
own testimony. Taggart concluded that plaintiff had commenced 
this action to get "his pound of flesh". (Taggart Cross-
examination, page 35) and that he would have to move out if 
plaintiff prevailed in this suit. (Taggart Redirect Examina-
tion, page 43) However, if Wade's claims of sale were upheld, 
Taggart would be able to retain possession of the property at 
least for an additional eighteen months. (Taggart Cross-
Examination, page 38, Wade Direct Examination, page 89) Wade 
estimated the value of the real property to be from $100,000 to 
$115,000. (Wade Direct Examination, page 78) Thus, if a sale 
were found to exist, Wade would receive a substantial return 
upon an investment of $17,000, while if his assertions are 
wrong, he would only receive a return of his $17,000 together 
with interest. Consequently, the difference in the outcome of 
this case meant in excess of $50,000 to Mr. Wade after ex-
cluding the amount of the encumbrances. 
In summary, each of the elements set forth herein when 
considered in light of the facts of this case show the existence 
of an equitable mortgage. A case similar to the facts and 
issues presented in this case also supports this conclusion. 
-12-
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In Orlando v. Berns, 316 Pl2d 704 (Cal. Ct. of App., 
1957), the plaintiff sought declaratory relief claiming that a 
conveyance of real property had actually been a secured loan 
transaction rather than a sale and option to repurchase. 
Plaintiff had become substantially indebted and was in danger 
of losing his real property. He had encountered difficulty in 
obtaining a loan to satisfy his debts and thereafter sought 
the assistance of the defendant. Negotiations resulted in 
plaintiff deeding his property to defendant who in turn gave 
plaintiff a written option to repurchase the property, con-
ditioned however upon the payment of a stated sum and the 
execution of a contract to repurchase. Defendant thereafter 
obtained a loan and used the proceeds and some additional money 
to satisfy plaintiff's debts. Plaintiff later exercised his 
option and executed a contract of repurchase. At trial the 
defendant testified that the price used for repurchase was an 
amount based upon the amount expended by defendant together 
with a stated return thereon rather than an amount determined 
by ascertaining the value of the land and buildings to be con-
veyed. The court concluded that this was the "thinking of a 
lender" and therefore upheld the trial court's determination 
that the transaction was in fact a loan and not a sale. 
A similar method of determining Taggart's repurchase price 
was used in this case. Wade wanted an amount equal to the 
-13-
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money advanced together with interest equal to the rate set 
forth in the Promissory Note, which had been committed to 
Taggart. 
In a case considered by the Utah Supreme Court, Bybee v. 
Stuart, 189 P.2d 118 (Utah 1948) the Court concluded that a 
deed was given as security where a contemporaneous written 
agreement was entered into which set forth that the conveyance 
was made to obtain a loan. The court stated at page 122: 
But where, as here, there is a written 
agreement between the parties, contem-
poraneous with the deed, which shows the 
deed to have been given for security 
purposes, the court will look to the real 
transaction, and treat it as a mortgage. 
In this case, the parties also executed a contemporaneous 
agreement, a Promissory Note (Exhibit P-3) which shows that the 
deed was given for security purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's action in asserting the existence of a mortgage 
is an action in equity. As such and as set forth in Corey v. 
Roberts, supra at page 942, it is the duty of the Supreme Court 
to examine "all questions of law and all facts revealed by the 
record". Plaintiff respectively asserts that such a review 
establishes by clear and convincing evidence the existence of 
an equitable mortgage. Although the defendants offered ex-
planations of their conduct, these explanations are properly 
characterized as were the explanations offered in Corey v. 
Roberts, supra at page 948. 
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Some explanations and reasons have 
been suggested, but we deem them of the 
character that usually arise after a 
change of intention has taken place in the 
hope of making them fit a situation firmly 
fixed before the explanation was thought 
of. 
It is therefore requested that the judgment of the trial 
court be reversed holding that an equitable mortgage was 
created in favor of the defendant Wade and that plaintiff's 
judgment is therefore a lien upon the real property of the 
defendant Taggart. 
Respectfully submitted this r~c/ day of April, 1980. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Plaintiff-Appellant Wayne B. Baker were served upon the De-
fendants and Respondent, H. B. and Edna Wade, by mailing the 
same, postage prepaid, to Ricardo B. Ferrari, 1200 Beneficial 
Life Tower, 36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
Attorney for H. B. and Edna Wade, this 3rd day of April, 1980. 
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